TITLE:
An Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
AUTHORS:
Juli Yin, Linfeng Wei, Hongliang Sun, Yifan Lin, Xufan Zhao
KEYWORDS:
VANETs, Mobile Crowd Sensing, Data Collection, Incentive Mechanism, Clustering Algorithm
JOURNAL NAME:
Journal of Transportation Technologies,
Vol.12 No.1,
January
20,
2022
ABSTRACT: In the mobile crowdsensing of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), in
order to improve the amount of data collection, an effective method to attract
a large number of vehicles is needed. Therefore, the incentive mechanism plays
a dominant role in the mobile crowdsensing of vehicular ad hoc networks. In addition,
the behavior of providing malicious data by vehicles as data collectors will
have a huge negative impact on the whole collection process. Therefore,
participants need to be encouraged to provide data honestly to obtain more
available data. In order to increase data collection and improve the
availability of collected data, this paper proposes an incentive mechanism for
mobile crowdsensing in vehicular ad hoc networks named V-IMCS. Specifically,
the Stackelberg game model, Lloyd’s clustering algorithm and reputation
management mechanism are used to balance the competitive relationship between
participants and process the data according to the priority order, so as to
improve the amount of data collection and encourage participants to honestly
provide data to obtain more available data. In addition, the effectiveness of
the proposed mechanism is verified by a series of simulations. The simulation
results show that the amount of available data is significantly higher than the
existing incentive mechanism while improving the amount of data collection.