E. Ostrom, R. Gardner and J. Walker, “Rules, Games, and Common-pool Resources,” University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1994.

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Studying Economics Reduces Overexploitation in a Common Resource Experiment

  AUTHORS: Nikolaos Georgantzis, José Santiago Arroyo-Mina, Daniel Guerrero

  KEYWORDS: Common-Pool Resources; Non-Cooperatives Games; Learning Processes

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.3 No.5B, September 24, 2013

  ABSTRACT: This paper studies the economical behavior of agents, who make decisions regarding the sustainability of Common-Pool Resources (CPR). For this purpose, economical experiments are applied to simulate the yield of a CPR taking into account the influence of economical training on the learning process of individuals regarding their decisions for sustainability. Based on a non-cooperative game with simultaneous choices, the results of experiments show that after several rounds the existence of economical knowledge reflects a better learning process for making decisions regarding sustainability of CPR.