Studying Economics Reduces Overexploitation in a Common Resource Experiment

Abstract

This paper studies the economical behavior of agents, who make decisions regarding the sustainability of Common-Pool Resources (CPR). For this purpose, economical experiments are applied to simulate the yield of a CPR taking into account the influence of economical training on the learning process of individuals regarding their decisions for sustainability. Based on a non-cooperative game with simultaneous choices, the results of experiments show that after several rounds the existence of economical knowledge reflects a better learning process for making decisions regarding sustainability of CPR.

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N. Georgantzis, J. Arroyo-Mina and D. Guerrero, "Studying Economics Reduces Overexploitation in a Common Resource Experiment," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 3 No. 5B, 2013, pp. 31-39. doi: 10.4236/tel.2013.35A2006.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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