O. Kadan and J. Swinkels, “Stock or Options? Moral Hazard, Firm Viability, and the Design of Compensation Contracts,” Washington University, St. Louis, 2005. http://www.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/swinkels/

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: On the Consistency of the First-Order-Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

  AUTHORS: Óscar Gutiérrez

  KEYWORDS: Moral Hazard; Principal-Agent Model; First-Order Approach; Likelihood Ratio; Option-Like Incentives.

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.2 No.2, May 23, 2012

  ABSTRACT: This paper revisits the principal-agent model with moral hazard when its solution is obtained invoking the first-order-approach. We show that the solution can be economically inconsistent even when “sufficient conditions” ensuring its validity ([1,2]) hold. To be more precise, we provide examples where is impossible to find Lagrange multipliers validating the approach. The correct solution to the problem provides a rationale for option-like contracts and minimum payments.