|
[1]
|
W. Rogerson, “The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems,” Econometrica, Vol. 53, No. 6, 1985, pp. 1357-1367. doi:10.2307/1913212
|
|
[2]
|
I. Jewitt, “Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems,” Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 5, 1988, pp. 1177-1190. doi:10.2307/1911363
|
|
[3]
|
J. Mirrlees, “Notes on Welfare Economics, Information and Uncertainty. In: M. Balch, D. McFadden and S.-Y. Wu, Eds., Essays on Economic Behavior under Uncertainty, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1974.
|
|
[4]
|
J. Mirrlees, “The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization,” Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1976, pp. 105-131.
doi:10.2307/3003192
|
|
[5]
|
J. Mirrlees, “The Implications of Moral Hazard for Optimal Insurance,” Seminar Given at Conference Held in Honor of Karl Borch, Bergen, 1979.
|
|
[6]
|
M. Spence and R. Zeckhauser, “Insurance, Information and Individual Action,” American Economic Review, Vol. 61, 1971, pp. 380-387.
|
|
[7]
|
S. Ross, “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem,” American Economic Review, Vol. 63, No. 2, 1973, pp. 134-139.
|
|
[8]
|
B. Holmstrom, “Moral Hazard and Observability,” Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1979, pp. 74-91.
doi:10.2307/3003320
|
|
[9]
|
J. Haubrich, “Risk Aversion, Performance Pay and the Principal-Agent Problem,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, No. 2, 1994, pp. 258-276. doi:10.1086/261931
|
|
[10]
|
D. Diamond and R. Verrecchia, “Optimal Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Security Prices,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 37, No. 2, 1982, pp. 275-287.
doi:10.2307/2327326
|
|
[11]
|
J. Raju and V. Srinivasan, “Quota-Based Compensation Plans for Multiterritory Heterogeneous Salesforces,” Management Science, Vol. 42, No. 10, 1996, pp. 1454-1462. doi:10.1287/mnsc.42.10.1454
|
|
[12]
|
T. Hemmer, O. Kim and R. Verrecchia, “Introducing Convexity into Optimal Compensation Contracts,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2000, pp. 307-327. doi:10.1016/S0165-4101(00)00008-2
|
|
[13]
|
L. Lambert and D. Larcker, “Stock Options, Restricted Stock, and Incentives,” SSRN Working Paper, 2004.
|
|
[14]
|
O. Kadan and J. Swinkels, “Stock or Options? Moral Hazard, Firm Viability, and the Design of Compensation Contracts,” Washington University, St. Louis, 2005.
http://www.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/swinkels/
|
|
[15]
|
O. Gutiérrez and V. Salas-Fumás, “Performance Standards and Optimal Contracts,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2008, pp. 139-152.
doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.11.001
|
|
[16]
|
G. Feltham and M. Wu, “Incentive Efficiency of Stock versus Options,” Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2001, pp. 7-28. doi:10.1023/A:1011377902967
|
|
[17]
|
X. Zhou and P. Swan, “Performance Thresholds in Managerial Incentive Contracts,” Journal of Business, Vol. 76, No. 4, 2003, pp. 665-696. doi:10.1086/377035
|
|
[18]
|
C. Prendergast, “The Provision of Incentives in Firms,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1999, pp. 7-63. doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7
|
|
[19]
|
I. Jewitt, O. Kadan and J. Swinkels, “Moral Hazard with Bounded Payments,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 143, No. 1, 2008, pp. 59-82.
doi:10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.004
|
|
[20]
|
J. Tirole, “The Theory of Industrial Organization,” The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1988.
|
|
[21]
|
J. Conlon, “Two New Conditions Supporting the First- Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principle-Agent Problems,” Econometrica, Vol. 77, No. 1, 2009, pp. 249- 278. doi:10.3982/ECTA6688
|
|
[22]
|
M. LiCalzi and S. Spaeter, “Distributions for the First- Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems,” Economic Theory, Vol. 21, 2003, pp. 167-173.
doi:10.1007/s00199-001-0250-y
|