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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0079-7421(08)00404-0

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Utilitarian Moral Judgments Are Cognitively Too Demanding

  AUTHORS: Sergio Da Silva, Raul Matsushita, Maicon De Sousa

  KEYWORDS: Cognitive Reflection, Utilitarianism, Moral Judgment

  JOURNAL NAME: Open Access Library Journal, Vol.3 No.2, February 4, 2016

  ABSTRACT: We evaluate utilitarian judgments under the dual-system approach of the mind. In the study, participants respond to a cognitive reflection test and five (sacrificial and greater good) dilemmas that pit utilitarian and non-utilitarian options against each other. There is judgment reversal across the dilemmas, a result that casts doubt in considering utilitarianism as a stable, ethical standard to evaluate the quality of moral judgments. In all the dilemmas, participants find the utilitarian judgment too demanding in terms of cognitive currency because it requires non-automatic, deliberative thinking. In turn, their moral intuitions related to the automatic mind are frame dependent, and thus can be either utilitarian or non-utilitarian. This suggests that automatic moral judgments are about descriptions, not about substance.