Price and Quantity Competition in a Mixed Duopoly with Emission Tax

Shuichi Ohori

Faculty of Informatics, Kansai University, Osaka, Japan.

DOI: 10.4236/tel.[phone]                

Abstract

This paper compares price and quantity competition in a mixed duopoly with emission tax; in a mixed duopoly, one public firm competes with one private firm in the market. We find that social welfare is the highest when both the firms simultaneously choose price levels. Then, the optimal emission tax is sufficiently lower than the marginal social damage.

Keywords

Mixed Duopoly; Price Competition; Quantity Competition; Environmental Policy

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

References

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