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http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781847200235.00011

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Price and Quantity Competition in a Mixed Duopoly with Emission Tax

  AUTHORS: Shuichi Ohori

  KEYWORDS: Mixed Duopoly; Price Competition; Quantity Competition; Environmental Policy

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.4 No.2, March 4, 2014

  ABSTRACT: This paper compares price and quantity competition in a mixed duopoly with emission tax; in a mixed duopoly, one public firm competes with one private firm in the market. We find that social welfare is the highest when both the firms simultaneously choose price levels. Then, the optimal emission tax is sufficiently lower than the marginal social damage.