M. A. Fonseca, W. Müller and H.-T. Normann, “Endogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence,” International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2006, pp. 443-456. doi:10.1007/s00182-006-0027-4

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Profit-Sharing and the Endogenous Order of Moves in Oligopoly

  AUTHORS: Hiroyuki Takami, Tamotsu Nakamura

  KEYWORDS: Profit-Sharing; Endogenous Timing; Observable Delay Game

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.2 No.2, May 23, 2012

  ABSTRACT: Whether firms move sequentially or simultaneously is one of the most important questions in the oligopoly theory. Forms of firms and/or their remuneration systems influence the decisions. This paper analyzes the effect of profit-sharing on the endogenous order of moves in a wage-setting stage of a unionized duopoly where one adopts profit-sharing while the other does not. It is shown that the two firms do not move simultaneously. In addition, if a fraction of profits going to the union is large, the Stackelberg equilibrium with the profit sharing firm moving first emerges endogenously.