Henriet, D. (2003). Paiements prospectifs, tarification à la pathologie, concurrence par comparaison. Note pour le Ministère de la Santé, de la Famille et des Personnes handicapées, Direction de l’hospitalisation et de l’organisation des soins, mission Tarification à l’activité.

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: The Financing of Public Hospitals in Senegal: Taking into Account the Asymmetry of Information

  AUTHORS: Mansoum Ndiaye, Mouhamadou Fall

  KEYWORDS: Public Hospital, Financing, Information Asymmetry, Senegal

  JOURNAL NAME: Modern Economy, Vol.16 No.6, June 24, 2025

  ABSTRACT: The objective of our study was to analyze the information asymmetry that exists between the state and public hospitals in Senegal. The use of a theoretical model to highlight hospital regulation has led to a number of important results. Indeed, the optimal solution consists in introducing a distortion in the cost reduction effort required to achieve an arbitrage between productive efficiency and the extraction of the hospital’s rent. The use of a menu of non-linear contracts for hospital funding is consistent with a cost reimbursement policy (such as the overall envelope policy) while a menu of linear contracts is modelled on the fixed-price pricing system (for example, by pathology or activity).