TITLE:
The Impact of Bank Loan on Executive Perquisites under the Background of Post-Split-Share Reform
AUTHORS:
Zhiqiang Ye, Linqi Liu, Luxin Wang, Wujue Ji, Wei Huang
KEYWORDS:
Executive Perquisites, Bank Loan, Split-Share Reform
JOURNAL NAME:
Modern Economy,
Vol.10 No.7,
July
19,
2019
ABSTRACT: Executive Perquisites are agency cost and harm the
interests of shareholders. After the split share reform, the first largest
shareholder has decreasing his shares and the problem of executives’
expropriation has been more prominent. This paper uses the data of Chinese
listed firms during 2006 to 2017 and investigates the corporate governance
effect of bank loan on executive perquisites. The results show that bank loan
can constraint the executive perquisites which have corporate governance effects;
the corporate governance effect of bank loan has more prominent in Non-SOEs
than in SOEs; and the corporate governance effect of bank loan has more
prominent in the listed firm with higher proportion of share of the first
largest shareholder. So the conclusions provide empirical evidence not only for
the discussion of commercial bank reform but also for the corporate governance
reform of Chinese listed firms under the financial systems of main bank
financing.