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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Partial Privatization in Price-Setting Mixed Duopolies with Complementary Goods

  AUTHORS: Kazuhiro Ohnishi

  KEYWORDS: Partial Privatization, Price-Setting Model, Domestic Mixed Duopoly, International Mixed Duopoly, Complementary Goods

  JOURNAL NAME: Modern Economy, Vol.2 No.1, February 24, 2011

  ABSTRACT: We consider a domestic (resp. international) mixed duopoly model in which a domestic public firm and a domestic (resp. foreign) private firm produce complementary goods. First, the domestic government chooses the level of privatization to maximize domestic social welfare. Second, observing the level of privatization, the firms simultaneously and independently choose prices. We present the equilibrium outcomes of the two mixed duopoly models and shows that our result is in marked contrast to that of the price-setting mixed du-opoly model with substitute goods.