Poguntke, T. (1999). Winner takes all: The FDP in 1982-1983: Maximizing votes, office, and policy? In W. C. Müller, & K. Strom (Eds.), Policy, office or votes? How political parties in Western Europe make hard decisions (pp. 216-236). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Ex Ante and ex Post Voting Power: A Method for Calculating Party Power in Party Government

  AUTHORS: Jan-Erik Lane, Alexander M. Preker

  KEYWORDS: Party Government; Government Coalitions and Coalitions in the Legislature; Ex Ante and ex Post Voting Power; Penrose-Banzhaf-Coleman Framework; Banzhaf Numbers or Scores; Double Banzhaf Games; Party Government in the Two German Speaking Nations

  JOURNAL NAME: Sociology Mind, Vol.3 No.2, April 25, 2013

  ABSTRACT: As political power tends to be wielded in the form of voting power in the national assembly, especially under the institutions of party government, one needs a method to calculate the voting power of political parties, both longitudinally and for a cross-section of European democracies. This paper suggests such a method, derived from the power index approach in cooperative game theory. The application of the method on the history of democracy in the two German nations results in party scores—mandates, ex ante and ex post voting power—that are much in congruence with the standard interpretations of the interwar period and the post-war politics in these two countries.