J. C. Barcena-Ruiz and F. J. Casado-Izaga, “Timing in Endogenous Bargaining over Costs and Firm Location,” Journal of Economics, Vol. 95, No. 2, 2008, pp. 149-166. doi:10.1007/s00712-008-0026-y

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: A Note on Timing of Endogenous Wage Bargaining: The Case of Complements

  AUTHORS: Kangsik Choi, Minhwan Lee

  KEYWORDS: Bargaining; Complements; Cournot-Bertrand Competition; Social Welfare

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.3 No.1, February 26, 2013

  ABSTRACT: By introducing Cournot and Bertrand competition in adifferentiated goods with the case of complements into Nash bargaining solution problem, we investigate timing of endogenous wage setting where wages can be negotiated either simultaneously or sequentially. Contrary to the case of substitutes, we show that regardless of the bargaining power, the type of product market competition (Cournot or Bertrand) and the degree of complementarity, 1) bargaining over wages is always simultaneous when the goods are complements; and 2) the social welfare under both Cournot and Bertrand competitions can improve when bargaining over wages is simultaneous.