C. Shapiro, “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standardsetting,” In: C. Shapiro, A. Jaffe, J. Lerner and S. Stern, Eds., Innovation Policy and the Economy, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 119-150.

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Package Licenses in Patent Pools with Basic and Optional Patents

  AUTHORS: Kenji Azetsu, Seiji Yamada

  KEYWORDS: Basic and Optional Patents; Patent Pools; Patent Pool Pricing; Single and Multiple Package Licenses

  JOURNAL NAME: Modern Economy, Vol.4 No.1, January 30, 2013

  ABSTRACT: Patent pools are established by the patent holders in order to promote R & D and technological standards, etc. This paper investigates the patent holders’ incentive to form a patent pool, the patent pool’s licensing behavior, and the anticompetitive effect of a patent pool. Our model is characterized by the following two features. First, we consider the different two types of patent: basic and optional. Second, we consider a patent pool that offers two types of a package license: single and multiple. Our results yield some implications for a patent pool that is characterized by the complementarity between basic and optional patents.