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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Game Analysis of Institutional Investors Participating in Corporate Governance

  AUTHORS: Yingzhao Li, Zhenqin Li

  KEYWORDS: Institutional Investor; Game; Tunneling Effect

  JOURNAL NAME: American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, Vol.3 No.1, January 17, 2013

  ABSTRACT: By building a game model between the institutional investors and the management, an analysis has been conducted to uncover the influential factors that are crucial to the role switching of institutional investors when confronting tunneling behaviors of the management: supervision cost, shareholding ratio, invisible income, fines and patience. In cases of lower supervision cost, higher shareholding ratios, less invisible income, larger amount of fines, more patience and pursuing long-term gains, institutional investors will tend to play an active role in corporate governance. They will act as an active supervisor to restrain the tunneling behavior of the management.