D. Stehle and R. Steinfeld, “Making NTRU as Secure as Worst-Case Problems over Ideal Lattices,” Advances in Cryptology—EUROCRYPT 2011—30th Annual International Conference on the Theory and applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Tallinn, 15-19 May 2011, pp. 27-47.

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Cryptanalysis of the Double-Moduli Cryptosystem

  AUTHORS: Sonia Mihaela Bogos, Serge Vaudenay

  KEYWORDS: Complex Modulus; Primary Residue; Plaintext Pre-Conditioning; Plaintext Attack; Public-Key Scheme; Lattices; LLL Algorithm; Orthogonal Lattices

  JOURNAL NAME: International Journal of Communications, Network and System Sciences, Vol.5 No.12, December 20, 2012

  ABSTRACT: In this article we present a lattice attack done on a NTRU-like scheme introduced by Verkhovsky in [1]. We show how, based on the relation between the public and private key, we can construct an attack which allows any passive adversary to decrypt the encrypted messages. We explain, step by step, how an attacker can construct an equivalent private key and guess what the original plaintext was. Our attack is efficient and provides good experimental results.