G. D’Agostini, “Role and Meaning of Subjective Probability; Some Comments on Common Misconceptions,” 20th International Workshop on Bayesian Inference and Maximum Entropy Methods in Science and Engineering, AIP Conference Proceedings, Vol. 568, 2001, 23 p. doi.org/10.1063/1.1381867

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: An Essay on the Double Nature of the Probability

  AUTHORS: Paolo Rocchi, Leonida Gianfagna

  KEYWORDS: Theory of Probability; Subjectivism; Frequentism; Theorem of Large Numbers; Probability Dualism

  JOURNAL NAME: Advances in Pure Mathematics, Vol.2 No.5, September 25, 2012

  ABSTRACT: Classical statistics and Bayesian statistics refer to the frequentist and subjective theories of probability respectively. Von Mises and De Finetti, who authored those conceptualizations, provide interpretations of the probability that appear incompatible. This discrepancy raises ample debates and the foundations of the probability calculus emerge as a tricky, open issue so far. Instead of developing philosophical discussion, this research resorts to analytical and mathematical methods. We present two theorems that sustain the validity of both the frequentist and the subjective views on the probability. Secondly we show how the double facets of the probability turn out to be consistent within the present logical frame.