A. Bergek and S. Jacobsson, “Are Tradable Green Certificates a Cost—Efficient Policy Driving Technical Change or a Rent—Generating Ma-chine Lessons from Sweden 2003-2008,” Energy Policy, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2010, pp.1255-1271. doi10.1016/j.enpol.2009.11.001 - References

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A. Bergek and S. Jacobsson, “Are Tradable Green Certificates a Cost—Efficient Policy Driving Technical Change or a Rent—Generating Ma-chine? Lessons from Sweden 2003-2008,” Energy Policy, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2010, pp.1255-1271. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.11.001

has been cited by the following article:

TITLE: A Preliminary Investigation of the Optimal Percentage Requirement in an Electricity Market with Tradable Green Certificates

AUTHORS: Kevin M. Currier, Susanne Rassouli-Currier

KEYWORDS: Renewable Energy; Tradable Green Certificates; Percentage Requirement; Renewable Portfolio Standard

JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.2 No.2, May 24, 2012

ABSTRACT: Around the world, energy markets are being liberalized with the goal of achieving fully competitive markets while at-taining environmental policy objectives. This paper considers a system of Tradable Green Certificates (TGCs)—a mar-ket based regulatory instrument designed to promote electricity generation from renewable energy sources. In a TGC program, the principal policy instrument is the “percentage requirement” which stipulates the percentage of total elec-tricity generation that must be obtained from renewable sources. This paper provides a preliminary investigation of the socially optimal choice of the percentage requirement in a Cournot duopoly setting. The paper discusses the problem geometrically and considers some of the practical difficulties associated with the determination of the optimal percent-age requirement. Several important avenues for generalization of the results are also discussed.