C. Bohringer and K. E. Rosendahl, “Green Promotes the Dirtiest On the Interaction between Black and Green Quotas in Energy Markets,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2010, pp. 316-325.doi10.1007/s11149-010-9116-1 - References

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C. Bohringer and K. E. Rosendahl, “Green Promotes the Dirtiest: On the Interaction between Black and Green Quotas in Energy Markets,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2010, pp. 316-325. doi:10.1007/s11149-010-9116-1

has been cited by the following article:

TITLE: A Preliminary Investigation of the Optimal Percentage Requirement in an Electricity Market with Tradable Green Certificates

AUTHORS: Kevin M. Currier, Susanne Rassouli-Currier

KEYWORDS: Renewable Energy; Tradable Green Certificates; Percentage Requirement; Renewable Portfolio Standard

JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.2 No.2, May 24, 2012

ABSTRACT: Around the world, energy markets are being liberalized with the goal of achieving fully competitive markets while at-taining environmental policy objectives. This paper considers a system of Tradable Green Certificates (TGCs)—a mar-ket based regulatory instrument designed to promote electricity generation from renewable energy sources. In a TGC program, the principal policy instrument is the “percentage requirement” which stipulates the percentage of total elec-tricity generation that must be obtained from renewable sources. This paper provides a preliminary investigation of the socially optimal choice of the percentage requirement in a Cournot duopoly setting. The paper discusses the problem geometrically and considers some of the practical difficulties associated with the determination of the optimal percent-age requirement. Several important avenues for generalization of the results are also discussed.