L. M. Camarinha-Matos and C. Lima, “Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives,” Econometrica, Vol. 55, No. 5, 1987, pp. 303-328.

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Principal-Agent Theory Based Risk Allocation Model for Virtual Enterprise

  AUTHORS: Min Huang, Guike Chen, Wai-Ki Ching, Tak Kuen Siu

  KEYWORDS: Virtual Enterprise, Risk Allocation, Principal-Agent Theory, Risk Aversion, Common Agency

  JOURNAL NAME: Journal of Service Science and Management, Vol.3 No.2, June 29, 2010

  ABSTRACT: In this paper, we consider a risk analysis model for Virtual Enterprise (VE) by exploring the state of the art of the principal-agent theory. In particular, we deal with the problem of allocating the cost of risk between two parties in a VE, namely, the owner and the partner(s). We first consider the case of a single partner of VE with symmetric information or asymmetric information and then the case of multiple partners. We also build a model for the optimal contract of the risk allocation based on the principal-agent theory and analyze it through specific example. At last we consider the case of multiple principal with potentially many partners based on common agency.