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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Two-Part Tariff Lottery: A Means to Provide Public Good at the Social Optimum

  AUTHORS: Amornrat Apinunmahakul, Vicky Barham

  KEYWORDS: Non-Profit Firms; Lottery; Public Goods; Two-Part Tariff

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.2 No.1, February 23, 2012

  ABSTRACT: Pure public goods provided by charitable organizations may be provided at the first-best level when the provision is financed by an appropriately designed lottery. If lottery tickets are sold using a two-part tariff, the level of provision of the public good is greater than when fees are not charged to participate in the lottery. Unlike [13] who asymptotically approach the first-best level of provision with an arbitrarily large prize, a Pareto efficient level of the public good is produced when participation fees for the lottery are set appropriately.