Moez, D. (2018). Agency Costs, Corporate Governance and the Nature of Controlling Shareholders: Evidence from French Listed Firms. International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting, 8, 256-277.
https://doi.org/10.5296/ijafr.v8i3.13621

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Agency Costs and the Power of “Apply and Explain” from South Africa

  AUTHORS: Nkwantabisa Agyeiwaa Owusu, Hadjor Falistus Raphael, Tchuiendem Nelly Joel

  KEYWORDS: Agency Costs, Board Characteristics, Institutional Investors, Apply and Explain

  JOURNAL NAME: Journal of Financial Risk Management, Vol.10 No.4, December 23, 2021

  ABSTRACT: This paper examines whether corporate governance mechanisms and the presence of institutional investors in South African publicly listed firms impact agency costs. Our findings show that large board size has harmful effects on agency costs; board independence allays agency costs. It is vital to distinguish institutional investors by investment objective and their monitoring ability to reduce agency costs. Results show that while institutional investors have taken as a homogenous group appeared to play an important governance role in allaying agency problems, pressure-insensitive investors can exert more influence in agency-related issues. Results have policy implications on the monitoring abilities of Independent Non-Executive Directors and institutional investors in South Africa.