TITLE:
Contribution Mechanisms and Types of Cost Threshold in the Subscription Game with Private Information on Valuation: Public Good Experiments
AUTHORS:
Hui-Chun Peng
KEYWORDS:
Simultaneous Contribution Mechanism, Sequential Contribution Mechanism, Cost Threshold, Laboratory Experiment
JOURNAL NAME:
Theoretical Economics Letters,
Vol.10 No.6,
December
11,
2020
ABSTRACT: This paper conducts a lab experiment to analyze
individual voluntary contribution behaviors in the simultaneous and sequential
contribution mechanisms with different types of the cost threshold. The
experimental results show that individual contribution behaviors are different
when individuals face different types of cost threshold and participate in
situations with different contribution mechanisms. When the cost threshold is
certain, the contribution in the simultaneous contribution mechanism is
significantly higher than the contribution in the sequential contribution
mechanism. Furthermore, the contribution with cost certainty is significantly
higher than the contribution with cost uncertainty, whether the contribution
mechanism is a simultaneous or sequential institution. As for individual
characteristic variables, the study finds that the “cooperative” individual
contributes more to the public goods than the “individualistic” individual
does.