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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-0155-1_4

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Optimal Insurance under Heterogeneous Belief

  AUTHORS: Huimin Yu, Ying Fang

  KEYWORDS: Optimal Insurance, Heterogeneous Belief, Incentive Compatibility, Wang’s Premium Principle

  JOURNAL NAME: Journal of Financial Risk Management, Vol.9 No.3, August 3, 2020

  ABSTRACT: In this paper, we study an optimal insurance problem, which allows the insured and the insurer to have heterogeneous probability beliefs in the distribution of potential losses, on the basis of which we maximize the expected utility of the insured’s final wealth. In order to reduce ex-post moral hazard, we assume that the alternative insurance contract follows the principle of indemnity and incentive compatibility constraints. Under the assumption of Wang’s premium principle, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal solution. Then we discuss some particular characteristics of the optimal solution and the optimality of no insurance and full insurance.