Winter, E., & Zamir, S. (2005). An Experiment with Ultimatum Bargaining in a Changing Environment. Japanese Economic Review, 56, 363-385.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00329.x

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Reciprocity in Repeated Emotion Game Experiments: Analyses of a Game-Theoretic Econometric Model

  AUTHORS: Zhi Fan, Keqiang Li, Ya Zhou

  KEYWORDS: Reciprocity, Emotion Game, Experiment, Game-Theoretic Econometric Model

  JOURNAL NAME: Open Journal of Social Sciences, Vol.8 No.3, March 13, 2020

  ABSTRACT: We conducted three treatments of human-computer repeated emotion game experiments and set up a game-theoretic econometric model to measure the impact of emotional reciprocity on behavior at the group level when self-interest is impossible. We found that the subjects still gave feedback in response to the opponent’s friendliness (unfriendliness), even if their behaviors could not change their expected payoffs. The subjects’ willingness to be altruistic increased in the level of altruism in the environment. However, when the opponent did not respond to their behaviors, the subjects’ willingness to be altruistic was lower than their opponents, especially when the opponents behaved more altruistically.