TITLE:
Management Shareholding Incentives and Enterprise Environmental Investment—Evidence from A-Share Heavily Polluting Industry Listed Companies
AUTHORS:
Han Wu
KEYWORDS:
Management Shareholding Incentives, Environmental Investment, Principal-Agent Problem
JOURNAL NAME:
Modern Economy,
Vol.11 No.1,
January
9,
2020
ABSTRACT: This paper adopts the sample of heavily polluting industry
listed companies’ data from 2013 to 2018, takes the amount of investment
related to environmental protection in “projects under construction” divided by
the capital stock as the proxy variable of environmental investment, takes the
shareholding ratio of management as the proxy variable of shareholding
incentive, empirically tests the relationship between the environmental
investment and the incentive of stock ownership, and finds that the incentive
of stock ownership significantly promotes the level of environmental
investment. In addition, the incentive effect of stock ownership on the level
of environmental investment only exists in the sample’s fierce industry competition.