Hagendorff, J. and Vallascas, F. (2011) CEO Pay Incentives and Risk-Taking: Evidence from Bank Acquisitions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, 1078-1095.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.009

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Weakening Effect of Executive Overconfidence on Equity Incentive—The Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

  AUTHORS: Sunyu Chen

  KEYWORDS: Executive Overconfidence, Equity Incentives, Risk

  JOURNAL NAME: Open Journal of Business and Management, Vol.7 No.1, January 7, 2019

  ABSTRACT: The paper takes Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2016 as samples, to examine the relationship between executive overconfidence and equity incen-tive. Results show that executive overconfidence has a significant weakening effect on equity compensation incentives (including stock options and re-stricted stocks), that is, compared with rational executives, the company will reduce the equity incentives for overconfident executives.