TITLE:
The Signaling Effect of Listed Companies’ Executives’ Shares Reduction —Empirical Evidence from Securities Lending Transactions in Chinese A-Share Market
AUTHORS:
Yaqi Wang, Kaiyan Wang
KEYWORDS:
Shares Reduction of Executives, Signaling Effect, Short Selling
JOURNAL NAME:
Open Journal of Business and Management,
Vol.6 No.2,
April
10,
2018
ABSTRACT:
Stock price was affected by listed company announcements, as well as other
non-systemic factors. Directors, supervisors and managers are company insiders.
Will their shares reduction announcements send negative signals to the
stock market? This article explores the signaling effect of shares reduction
through empirical study, and found that for those companies in sales growth,
sales reduction announcements from executives had a rather significant role
in signaling. This article will extend the range of signaling theory in some degree,
and help regulators gain a better understanding of how the investors
make their investment decisions in the market.