Gavrel, F. (2009) Technical Skill Bias as a Response of Firms to Unemployment: A Matching Model with Applicant Ranking and Endogenous Skill Requirements. Labor Economics, 16, 304-310.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2008.11.003

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Endogenous Ranking in the Two-Sector Urn-Ball Matching Process

  AUTHORS: Giuseppe Rose

  KEYWORDS: Matching Function, Urn-Ball Model, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.8 No.3, February 12, 2018

  ABSTRACT: This paper contributes to the debate concerning micro-foundations of matching functions in frictional labor markets. The focus is on a particular matching regime, i.e., the so-called urn-ball process. It is shown that in a twosector economy, even in the presence of heterogeneous workers, the assumption of applicants-ranking may be misleading. Instead, the choice concerning the adoption of either ranking or no-ranking behavior is endogenous and it is affected by both the tightness of the two sectors and the composition of the labor force in terms of skills. Moreover it is proved that exogenous shocks may change the form of the matching function. This result casts additional doubts on the assumption of exogenous matching function often made in empirical works aimed at assessing the effectiveness of policy measures.