TITLE:
The Mixed Berge Equilibrium in Extensive Form Games
AUTHORS:
Ahmad Nahhas, H. W. Corley
KEYWORDS:
Mixed Berge Equilibrium, Extensive Form Games, Game Theory
JOURNAL NAME:
Theoretical Economics Letters,
Vol.7 No.7,
December
18,
2017
ABSTRACT: In this paper we apply the concept of a mixed Berge
equilibrium to finite n-person games
in extensive form. We study the mixed Berge equilibrium in both perfect and
imperfect information finite games. In addition, we define the notion of a
subgame perfect mixed Berge equilibrium and show that for a 2-person game,
there always exists a subgame perfect Berge equilibrium. Thus there exists a
mixed Berge equilibrium for any 2-person game in extensive form. For games with
3 or more players, however, a mixed Berge equilibrium and a subgame perfect
mixed Berge equilibrium may not exist. In summary, this paper extends extensive
form games to include players acting altruistically.