Condorelli, D. (2013) Market and Non-Market Mechanisms for the Optimal Allocation of Scarce Resources. Games and Economic Behavior, 82, 582-591.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.008

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Optimal (Under-)Pricing and Allocation of Publicly Provided Goods

  AUTHORS: David Scrogin

  KEYWORDS: Expected Consumer Surplus, Non-Market Mechanism, Lottery, Hazard Rate, Mean Residual Value

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.7 No.4, May 15, 2017

  ABSTRACT: This paper exploits the links between a private value distribution’s hazard rate, mean residual value, and eta functions in order to characterize posted-price rules for a public agency to allocate scarce units of an indivisible good under the utilitarian distributional objective of maximizing expected consumer surplus. Sufficient conditions on the monotonic and non-monotonic classes of the functions are established that identify either market assignment at the clearing price or lottery assignment with partial or complete under-pricing as the optimal allocation mechanism. The results are summarized across a wide range of parametric value distributions, and selected non-monotonic cases are evaluated numerically to determine the relative scarcity or abundance of the good necessary for market or non-market assignment to dominate.