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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: A Study of Reputation Effect Restricting the Moral Hazard in C2C E-Commerce

  AUTHORS: Xiaoying Xu, Maoran Ye

  KEYWORDS: Moral Hazard, Reputation Model, C2C E-Commerce

  JOURNAL NAME: Open Journal of Social Sciences, Vol.5 No.3, March 31, 2017

  ABSTRACT: Based on repeated game and unilateral moral hazard framework, this thesis studies the formation and evolution of reputation in C2C E-Market and the restriction effect of reputation to the sellers’ moral hazard behavior. The research on reputation model shows that the formation of reputation is a dynamic process, which is regulated by sellers in C2C E-Market. In the market introducing the reputation mechanism, the most effective way to restrict moral hazard behavior is to leverage the sellers’ long-term benefits, stabilize the market, and reduce transaction cost.