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https://doi.org/10.1086/262093

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Economic Value Added, Corporation Growth and Overinvestment—Based on State-Owned Corporations

  AUTHORS: Ying Wang, Yaqi Wang

  KEYWORDS: EVA (Economic Value Added), Corporation Growth, Overinvestment, SOEs (State-Owned Corporations)

  JOURNAL NAME: Modern Economy, Vol.7 No.14, December 14, 2016

  ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes if EVA (Economic Value Added) evaluation system can reduce the corporations’ overinvestment phenomenon by using the study sample of 204 listed SOEs (state-owned corporations) with the sample period from 2007 to 2012. Then according to Tobin’s Q value, we divided all the 204 listed SOEs into two groups, high growth corporations and low growth corporations, and observed if the implementation of EVA has different inhibition effect on the listed SOEs of different growth. The results indicated that EVA can’t significantly reduce the listed SOEs’ overinvestment, but it has different inhibition effect on different growth corporations. The EVA can significantly reduce low growth listed SOEs’ overinvestment, which suggests the EVA evaluation system can improve low growth corporations’ investment situation.