Gao, P.J. and Shrieves, R.E. (2002) Earnings Management and Executive Compensation: A Case of Overdose of Option and Underdose of Salary. University of Tennessee, Working Paper.

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Equities Incentive, Informativeness of Stock Price and Earnings Management: Based on the Chinese A-Share Listed Companies

  AUTHORS: Qifan Zhong

  KEYWORDS: Equities Incentive, Informativeness of Stock Price, Earnings Management

  JOURNAL NAME: Modern Economy, Vol.7 No.3, March 22, 2016

  ABSTRACT: Equities incentive is more and more frequently used for motivating management among Chinese listed companies, but whether it will degrade informativeness of stock price, thus reduce the efficiency of capital allocation in security market remains to be verified. This article used the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2010-2014, deployed an empirical research to study the relationship between equities incentive and informativeness of stock price, considering earnings management as an intermediary variable. According to the analysis results, we found that higher level of equities incentive tended to degrade the level of informativeness of stock price, and the earnings management was not an effective intermediary variable, which meant the earnings management resulted from equities incentive was less likely to affect informativeness of stock price.