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Article citations


Cumming, D. J. and Macintosh, J. G., “A cross-country comparison of full and partial capital exits,” in University of Toronto Law and Economics Research Paper No. 01–04, May 2002, available on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Electronic Library at: http://ssrn. com/abstract=268557.

has been cited by the following article:

  • TITLE: A Note on Secondary Buyouts-Creating Value or Recycling Capital


    KEYWORDS: Management Buyouts, Performance, Private Equity, Secondary Buyout

    JOURNAL NAME: iBusiness, Vol.1 No.2, December 18, 2009

    ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes whether secondary buyouts of private equity (PE) investors in general create value and therefore are a suitable alternative to exit strategies like trade sales and IPOs. Theoretically, two conflicting approaches might explain the use of secondary buyouts as an exit channel of private equity investors: the capital recycling effects and different potential sources of value creation. We present empirical tests of these approaches. The profitability of secondary buyouts is assessed by a comparison of exit multiples realized with secondary buyouts and trade sales. The results are not unequivocal, but overall we interpret our findings in a way that awards secondary buyouts a profitability that is not significantly different from trade sales. Therefore, we argue that secondary buyouts have the potential for adding value that arise from different sources like the reduction of agency costs or the functions of the financial investor. Secondary buyouts should thus not be seen as a second best alternative for recycling the PE investors’ capital in situations where alternative—and supposedly more attractive—exit channels are unavailable.