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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Credibility and Signaling as Strategic Drivers in China’s African Security Engagement

  AUTHORS: Fanie Herman

  KEYWORDS: China, Strategic Interaction, Credibility, Signaling, Motivations

  JOURNAL NAME: Chinese Studies, Vol.4 No.1, February 11, 2015

  ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to show that strategic interaction provides a fruitful way to understand China’s decision-making behavior. States are actors in global politics and frequently have to make choices that are strategic. Credibility and uncertainty are central issues in this environment of incomplete information. This raises the question how China signals its motivations along this strategic chessboard. Strategic interaction assumes purposeful behavior from China in the African security environment. Signaling allows China to consider the problem of unknown motivations, making choices based in part, on what other actors are likely to do in the future. Knowing the choices of other African actors can help China judge what likely responses are.