Chang, W.W. and Sugeta, H. (2004) Conjectural Variations, Market Power, and Optimal Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry. Review of International Economics, 12, 12-26.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2004.00428.x

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Optimum-Welfare and Maximum-Revenue Tariffs in Vertically Related Markets

  AUTHORS: Yasushi Kawabata

  KEYWORDS: Optimum-Welfare Tariff, Maximum-Revenue Tariff, Vertically Related Markets, Cournot Competition

  JOURNAL NAME: Modern Economy, Vol.5 No.5, May 23, 2014

  ABSTRACT: This paper compares the optimum-welfare tariffs with the maximum-revenue tariffs in a model of vertically related markets characterized by Cournot competition. It shows that the optimum-welfare tariff on the intermediate good exceeds the maximum-revenue tariff if the home intermediate-good firm is much more cost-competitive than the foreign intermediate-good firm. Further, the optimum-welfare tariff on the final good exceeds the maximum-revenue tariff if the home intermediate-good firm is significantly inefficient compared to the foreign intermediate-good firm. It is less likely that the optimum-welfare tariffs on the intermediate and the final good, respectively, exceed the maximum-revenue tariffs on the intermediate and the final good in the presence of vertical trade structures than in their absence.