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F. Kofman and J. Lawarrée, “Collusion in Hierarchical Agency,” Econometrica, Vol. 61, No. 3, 1993, pp. 629- 656.

has been cited by the following article:

  • TITLE: The Collusion Deterrence with Prisoner’s Dilemma

    AUTHORS: Aidong Liu, Jinfang Liu

    KEYWORDS: Audit Collusion, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Double Auditing, Ethical Constraint

    JOURNAL NAME: Journal of Service Science and Management, Vol.3 No.4, December 28, 2010

    ABSTRACT: I tried to present a new method to prevent collusion through employing two auditors at the same time and inspiring them provide true report by exploiting their prisoner’s dilemma. But I found this method cannot be put into practice because of the high cost. So I analyzed whether sending the second auditor in a probability, a low cost method, can deter the audit collusion. I find sending the second auditor in a probability, enforcing the rigidly lawful punishment and perfecting the reward mechanism can prevent audit collusion. I also find the auditor’s ethical constraint do good to prevent collusion and the charger of state assets management can play the same role as the real owner of the state-owned enterprise in deterring collusion. This finding provides theory support for the government to implement the publicly audit bidding and random double auditing system on state-owned enterprise. The supervision of PCAOB on auditors is also the operation of this theory.