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Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1989) Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-Specific Investments. Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 123-139.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(89)90099-8

has been cited by the following article:

  • TITLE: Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in Emerging Markets: Evidence from India

    AUTHORS: Sheeba Kapil, Rakesh Mishra

    KEYWORDS: Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure, Board Structure, Firm Performance, India, Emerging Markets, Family Capitalism

    JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.9 No.6, August 29, 2019

    ABSTRACT: This study attempts to explore the link between corporate governance system developed by firms like promoter ownership, institutional relationship (as percentage ownership in the firm), foreign institutional investors (FII) ownership, board size (log assets), family control which is a significant indicator for board independence. Further we have also taken CEO duality, number of board meetings and busyness of directors and linked it with firm performance. Market based firm performance measures and accounting based performance show different impact. Findings indicate that impact of corporate governance variables on market based performance measures (Tobin’s Q) is greater than the impact on accounting based performance measures (ROA and ROE). Ownership structure i.e. family capitalism impacts market based performance measures more whereas board structure impacts accounting based performance measure more. Among board variables, board size is found to impact performance positively and CEO duality is found to impact performance negatively. Board independence i.e. “monitoring board” is found to impact accounting based performance positively, whereas number of board meetings is found to impact market based performance measure positively. Directors’ internal busyness is not found to impact any of the performance measures. Directors’ external busyness is impacting accounting based measures negatively when the busyness is measured in terms of position of directors in other companies.