The Mind-Body Problem Today

Gabriel Vacariu
DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2011.11005                

Abstract

An old philosophical problem, the mind-body problem, has not been yet solved by philosophers or scientists. Even if in cognitive neuroscience has been a stunning development in the last 20 years, the mind-body problem remained unsolved. Even if the majority of researchers in this domain accept the identity theory from an ontological viewpoint, many of them reject this position from an epistemological viewpoint. In this context, I consider that it is quite possible the framework of this problem to be wrong and this is the main reason the problem could not be solved. I offer an alternative, the epistemologically different worlds perspective, that replace the world or the universe. In this new context, the mind-body problem becomes a pseudo-problem.

Keywords

Cognitive Neuroscience, Mind, Brain, Epistemologically Different Worlds

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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