Quality of Service on Queueing Networks for the Internet

Hans W. Gottinger

STRATEC, Munich, Germany.

DOI: 10.4236/ib.2013.53012                

Abstract

Most studies of resource allocation mechanisms in Internet traffic have used a performance model of the resource provided, where the very concept of the resource is defined in terms of measurable qualities of the service such as utilization, throughput, response time (delay), security level among others. Optimization of resource allocation is defined in terms of these measurable qualities. One novelty introduced by an economic mechanism design approach is to craft a demand-driven system which takes into account the diverse QoS requirements of users, and therefore, uses multiobjective (utility) optimization techniques to characterize and compute optimum allocations. Economic modelling of computer and communication resource sharing uses a uniform paradigm described by two level modelling: QoS requirements as inputs into a performance model that is subject to economic optimization.

Keywords

Internet Economics; Network Economy; Queueing Systems; Mechanism Design; Performance Management

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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