Design on the Incentive Contract of University Achievements Commercialization Offices Based on Principal-Agent Theory

Meifang Li, Yongxiang Zhao, Feng Shi
DOI: 10.4236/jssm.2010.31009                

Abstract

Based on principal-agent theory, an incentive contract model of university achievements commercialization offices (UACO) was constructed in this paper, and an optimal incentive contract between university and UACO was researched into. The conclusion indicates that many factors, such as working ability, working willingness, risk aversion degree of UACO, as well as the outside uncertain factors and so on, have important influences on the contract design. The efficiency of commercialization of university inventions has a squared forward growth relation with working ability, a direct proportion with working willingness, and has an inverse proportion with risk aversion degree of UACO and with outside uncertainty. Additionally, the level of hard working of UACO under the condition of information asymmetry is strictly less than that of information symmetry.

Keywords

University Achievements Commercialization Offices (UACO), Achievements Commercialization, Principal-agent, Incentive Contract

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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