An Incentive Scheme to Increase Female Access to and Completion of Basic Education in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Noel A. Ihebuzor

Development and Educational Consultant, Abuja, Nigeria.

DOI: 10.4236/oalib.1101023                

Abstract

Policy reforms in education have considerable potential to correct social inequities and assist in the building of more inclusive societies either through improved efficiencies and/or equity in education service provision. Primary education is a public service whose consumption has huge positive externalities—social and economic benefits. In many developing countries, girls are usually excluded from the consumption of this service for a variety of reasons—some of which are social, cultural or economic. The article describes and justifies a reform initiative conceived to increase female access to primary education in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and sketches an incentive scheme, whose purpose is to improve teacher commitment and improve learning outcomes, for its implementation. The reform measure being proposed, specific egalitarianism (a progenitor of modern-day social transfer schemes) is argued to be robust enough to ensure that girls who are usually the most excluded ones from primary education in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are enable to access this service as a way of addressing gender equity issues. This type of social transfer (social benefit) strategy when coupled with an incentive scheme that rewards teachers for productivity would yield the socially desirable/beneficial outcome of more girls’ enrolling and completing primary education.

Keywords

Social Benefits, Girls Education, Specific Egalitarianism, Conditional Cash Transfers, Incentive Schemes, Performance Measures

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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