Research on the Trans-Regional Integration of Chinese Family Enterprise Based on the Perspective of Organizational Trust and Control
—A Case Study of Hope Group


Under the background of Chinese Regional Market Segmentation and Familism Dilemma, this article deeply analyses Hope Group with the method of case study and then demonstrates the relationship between the trans-regional market scope, organizational trust and control. The result shows that, on the one hand, the market scope influences the way of control directly, that is, with the expansion of the market, family enterprise tends to adopt formal control rather than informal control. On the other hand, the scope of trans-regional market integration affects the way of organizational control indirectly by having an influence on organizational trust. With the enlargement of market scope, the evolution of organization trust helps to optimize control mode and finally achieve the integration of formal control and informal control in China’s family enterprise.

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Xu, S. and Huang, X. (2015) Research on the Trans-Regional Integration of Chinese Family Enterprise Based on the Perspective of Organizational Trust and Control
—A Case Study of Hope Group. Open Journal of Social Sciences, 3, 80-92. doi: 10.4236/jss.2015.312009.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.


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