The Fukushima Nuclear Accident: Insights on the Safety Aspects


The Fukushima nuclear accident has generated doubts and questions which need to be properly understood and addressed. This scientific attitude became necessary to allow the use of the nuclear technology for electricity generation around the world. The nuclear stakeholders are working to obtain these technical answers for the Fukushima questions. We believe that, such challenges will be, certainly, implemented in the next reactor generation, following the technological evolution. The purpose of this work is to perform a critical analysis of the Fukushima nuclear accident, focusing at the common cause failures produced by tsunami, as well as an analysis of the main redundant systems. This work also assesses the mitigative procedures and the subsequent consequences of such actions, which gave results below expectations to avoid the progression of the accident, discussing the concept of sharing of structures, systems and components at multi-unit nuclear power plants, and its eventual inappropriate use in safety-related devices which can compromise the nuclear safety, as well as its consequent impact on the Fukushima accident scenario. The lessons from Fukushima must be better learned, aiming the development of new procedures and new safety systems. Thus, the nuclear technology could reach a higher evolution level in its safety requirements. This knowledge will establish a conceptual milestone in the safety system design, becoming necessary the review of the current acceptance criteria of safety-related systems.

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Thomé, Z. , Gomes, R. , Silva, F. and Vellozo, S. (2015) The Fukushima Nuclear Accident: Insights on the Safety Aspects. World Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology, 5, 169-182. doi: 10.4236/wjnst.2015.53017.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.


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