A Behavioral Study of the Normative of the Listed Company Information Disclosure after IPO

Shuxin Cao, Jianqiong Wang

Southwest Jiaotong University of Economic and Management, Chengdu, China.

DOI: 10.4236/ajibm.2014.412081                

Abstract

This paper sets the corporations which occurs first information disclosure violation after IPO as a research object, using theoretical analysis and empirical analysis to study related issues of corporation information disclosure violations. This paper contacts this time length with causes of violated information disclosure and builds regression model. And there comes the result: the proportion of independent directors has positive correlation with the time length of corporation’s first violation after IPO; the proportion of managerial ownership has positive correlation with the time length of corporation’s first violation after IPO; the pressure of insurance license could shorten the time length of corporation’s first violation after IPO. This paper based on existed researches and analysis the feature of corporation violation types, adopts ordered logistic regression model to predict corporation violation types. Finally, this paper gives a series of recommendations based on the causes of corporations’ information disclosure.

Keywords

Information Disclosure, Type of Violation, Time of Violation, Forecast

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

References

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