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Empirical Identity as an Indicator of Theory Choice

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DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2014.44060    6,410 Downloads   7,095 Views  
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ABSTRACT

There are many theories about theory choice in philosophy of science, but no any indicator of scientific theory has been precisely defined, let alone a united index system. By the example of empirical identity, I shall show that a range of scientific indicators to decide theory choice can be precisely defined by some basic concepts. I think that these indicators can provide us a better description of the principles of philosophy of science. The certain pursuit of theories’ empirical identity and novelty leads the cumulative view of scientific progress; under non-cumulative circumstance, it is totally practicable to judge a theory’s empirical identity as well as empirical novelty; empirical identity underdetermines the acceptance of a particular theory. It is possible that all the principles of philosophy of science could be explained again through the system of index of theory choice, thus a more rigorous theory of philosophy of science could be established.

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Ma, L. (2014) Empirical Identity as an Indicator of Theory Choice. Open Journal of Philosophy, 4, 584-591. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2014.44060.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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