Empirical Identity as an Indicator of Theory Choice

Lei Ma

School of Humanities, Southeast University, Nanjing, China.

DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2014.44060                

Abstract

There are many theories about theory choice in philosophy of science, but no any indicator of scientific theory has been precisely defined, let alone a united index system. By the example of empirical identity, I shall show that a range of scientific indicators to decide theory choice can be precisely defined by some basic concepts. I think that these indicators can provide us a better description of the principles of philosophy of science. The certain pursuit of theories’ empirical identity and novelty leads the cumulative view of scientific progress; under non-cumulative circumstance, it is totally practicable to judge a theory’s empirical identity as well as empirical novelty; empirical identity underdetermines the acceptance of a particular theory. It is possible that all the principles of philosophy of science could be explained again through the system of index of theory choice, thus a more rigorous theory of philosophy of science could be established.

Keywords

Empirical Identity, Theory Choice, United Index System, Kuhnian Losses, Underdetermination

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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