The Theoretical Analysis of the Allocation of Family Control Rights Based on Guanxi in China

Lingyan Gu

doi:10.4236/ojbm.2014.24037

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The Theoretical Analysis of the Allocation of Family Control Rights Based on Guanxi in China ()

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DOI: 10.4236/ojbm.2014.24037 4,206 Downloads 4,685 Views

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Lingyan Gu^*

Affiliation(s)

School of Accounting, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou, China.

ABSTRACT

With the development of the family businesses, family members are coming from diversified source. Under this circumstance, guanxi and potential conflicts between family members are becoming complicated. The allocation of control rights among the family members plays an important role. This paper proposes the allocation concept of the family guanxi-oriented control rights for the first time. On the basis of the review of classical theories about the control rights allocation, it builds a theoretical analysis framework of family control rights allocation embedding guanxi.

KEYWORDS

Family Members, Family Control Rights, Allocation, Guanxi, Theoretical Analysis

Cite this paper

Gu, L. (2014) The Theoretical Analysis of the Allocation of Family Control Rights Based on Guanxi in China. Open Journal of Business and Management, 2, 314-320. doi: 10.4236/ojbm.2014.24037.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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