Dynamic Reflections on Constitutional Justice

Roberto Scarciglia

Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Trieste, Trieste, Italy.

DOI: 10.4236/blr.2014.52012                

Abstract

This article attempts to propose critical reflections on “historical” models of Constitutional Review. The gradual depletion of the simplified classification system of constitutional review has been identified, by some scholars, as a failure of the bipolar American-European model. This means that it is necessary to rethink the approach to analysing constitutional review, in light of legal traditions, positive law within legal systems, and comparative methodologies. Consequently, judicial review could be studied according to the internal perspectives of the Supreme and Constitutional Courts’ decision-making processes, rather than externally observable legal characteristics. As of recently, legal studies have been converging with other sciences, such as cognitive science. They have been considering the relationship between consciousness and comparison, and even the field of cognitive errors in judgment, and the development of decisions taken by Courts.

Keywords

Constitutional Justice, Judicial Opinions, Neuroscience and Law

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

References

[1]	Ainsworth, I. E. (1996). Categories and Culture: On the “Rectification of Names” in Comparative Law. Cornell Law Revue, 82, 28.
[2]	Badiou, A. (1969). Le concept de modele. Introduction a une epistemologie materialiste des mathematiques. Paris: Fayard.
[3]	Behrendt, C. (2006). Le juge constitutionnel, un legislateur-cadre positif. Bruxelles: 126.
[4]	Cassese, S. (2013). Lezione sulla cosiddetta opinione dissenziente. 1-17. www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/convegni_seminari/Opinione_dissenziente_Cassese.pdf
[5]	Chorvat, T., & Mc Gabe, K. (2004). The Brain and the Law. 359 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 1733.
[6]	Constantinesco, L.-J. (1972). Il metodo comparativo. Torino: Giappichelli, It. tr, 2000, 161.
[7]	Ewald, W. (1998). The Jurisprudencial Approach to Comparative Law: A Field Guide to Rats. 46 American Journal of Comparative Law, 704.
[8]	Fernández Segado, F. (2004). La faillite de la bipolarite “modele americain-modele europeen” en tant que critere analytique du controle de la constitutionnalite et la recherche d’une nouvelle typologie explicative. In Melanges en l’honneur de Franck Moderne (p. 1108). Paris: Dalloz.
[9]	Glenn, H. P. (2007). Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law (3rd ed.). Oxford: OUP.
[10]	Guiner L. (2008). Foreword: Demosprudence through Dissent. Harvard Law Review, 22, 4.
[11]	Guthrie, C., Rachlinski, J. J., & Wistrich, A. J. (2001). Inside the Judicial Mind. Cornell Law Review, 86, 778.
[12]	Harlow, C. (2002). Voice of Difference in a Plural Community. American Journal of Comparative Law, 2, 339-367. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/840824
[13]	Holmes Jr., W. O. (1881). The Common Law. Boston, Mass: Little, Brown.
[14]	Holmes Jr., W. O. (1897). The Path of Law. Harvard Law Review, 10, 457.
[15]	Markesinis, B., & Fedtke, J. (2006). Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A New Source of Inspiration. New York: Routledge, 173.
[16]	Menski, W. (2006). Comparative Law in a Global Context; The legal Systems of Asia and Africa (2nd ed.). Cambridge: CUP. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511606687
[17]	O’Hara, E. A. (2006). How Neuroscience Might Advance the Law. In S. Zeki, & O. Goodenough (Eds.), Law and the Brain (p. 25). Oxford: OUP.
[18]	Polanyi, M. (1966). The Tacit Dimension. New York: Anchor Book.
[19]	Posner, R. A. (2008). How Judges Think. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[20]	Quine, W. O. (1969). Ontological Relativity & Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press, 32.
[21]	Quine, W. O. (1953). From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 82.
[22]	Sacco, R. (2007). Antropologia giuridica: Contributo a una macrostoria del diritto (Legal Anthropology: A Contribution to the Macro-History of Law). Bologna: Il Mulino.
[23]	Schmidt, C. W., & Shapiro, C. (2010). Oral dissenting in Supreme Court. William & Mary Bill of Rights, 19, 75.
[24]	Torres, G. (2007). Legal Change: The Eighty-Third Cleveland-Marshall Fund Visiting Scholar Lecture. Cleveland St. Law Review, 55, 135.
[25]	Tusseau, G. (2009). Contre les “modeles” de justice constitutionnelle: Essai de critique methodologique. Bologna: Bononia University Press, 17.
[26]	Wigmore, J. H. (1941). A Kaleidoscope of Justice Containing Authentic Accounts of Trial Scenes from All Times and Climes. Washington DC: Washington Law Books.
[27]	Wigmore, J. H. (1936). Panorama of the World’s Legal Systems. Washington DC: Washington Law Books.
[28]	Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophische Untersuchungen . Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 34.